






Epistemic Game of Thrones
Abstract
The aim of this paper is rather modest: I want to provide an account of some of the most re­
cent developments in epistemology, characterized by a certain shift that has been going on 
for some time now. This shift is best explained as the abandonment of traditional, monistic 
picture (according to which knowledge is the only important achievement in our attempt to 
cognitively grasp the world), and the acceptance of pluralism (according to which there are 
other important cognitive achievements we should strive for, most notably understanding 
and wisdom). One of the crucial aspects of this shift is the question about which cognitive 
state inherits knowledge as the prime epistemic value, and this is the aspect I will be mostly 
interested in. I will claim that the pluralistic picture fits much better into our cognitive 
engagement with the world, with other people, and with ourselves. In that sense, rather 
than rooting for one value as the holder of the epistemic throne, we should acknowledge the 
irreplaceable contribution that each has for our attempts to come to terms with who we are 
and with our experience of the world.
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1. Epistemic aims and values: 
  monism vs. pluralism






























































































































practical	 implication	 given	 that	 they	 make	
those	 who	 study	 them	 happy.	 But	 then	 it	
seems	that	all	truths	are	important	in	that	they	
help	promote	some	other	goods.	I	don’t	think	
this	 is	 a	 problem	 for	 me.	 I	 simply	 want	 to	
show	(though	not	much	rests	on	this)	that,	in	
certain	sense	at	least,	it	is	a	thin	line	between	
the	 number	 of	 blades	 of	 grass,	 the	 number	
of	 houses	 available	 for	 homeless,	 and	 the	






























skills	 of	 cognizers.4	Generally	 speaking,	 such	 theories	 see	knowledge	 as	 a	
kind	of	cognitive	achievement	that	springs	from	cognizer’s	ability	and	there-
fore	deserves	credit.
There	 is	a	 lot	 that	 is	valuable	 in	 the	virtue	epistemology	primarily	because	
it	recognizes	the	important	place	that	 individual	cognizer	and	his	cognitive	
apparatus	and	intellectual	character	hold	in	the	human	pursuit	of	knowledge	







help	him	 in	 leading	a	good	 life.	Before	we	elaborate	on	 this	connection	 in	
more	details,	let’s	turn	briefly	to	see	how	epistemology	has	modified	itself	in	
order	to	accommodate	these	new	considerations.

































includes	 various	 kinds	 of	 cognizing,	 including	 processes	 such	 as	 thinking,	































tails	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 testimony	 and	
conditions	 that	 have	 to	 be	 fulfilled	 for	 it	 to	





















changes	 in	 one’s	world	 view	or	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 different	 perspective	 on	
things”.	Both,	testimony	and	literary	works	can	contribute	to	these	kinds	of	
































































































See:	 Pritchard	 2010	 (in	 Pritchard,	 Millar,	
Haddock	2010);	Kvanvig	2003,	2005,	2008;	
Riggs	 2003,	 2008;	 Elgin	 1996;	 Zagzebski	
2001;	Gardiner	2012.
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Kvanvig	 calls	 this	 (and	 argues	 against)	 the	
common	assumption	about	the	nature	of	un-
derstanding:	 “Though	 the	 nature	 of	 under-
standing	 is	 not	 often	 addressed,	 it	 is	 none-














part	 of	 such	 explanation	was	knowing	 the	 reasons	 (causes)	which	made	A	
(rather	B	or	C)	develop.
Second	worry	is	that	one	might	end	up	explaining	what	understanding	is	by	
providing	 an	 example	of	 it:	 understanding	 is	what	 it	 is	 involved	 in	 under-
standing	a	 sentence,	or	 a	mathematic	proof.	Though	 this	 is	 a	good	pointer	
towards	how	to	 think	of	understanding,	 it	 is	 radically	 too	narrow	and	does	
not	allow	for	a	full	impact	that	understanding	as	cognitive	success	bears.	One	










aspects	which	 couldn’t	 have	 been	 taken	 into	 consideration	 before.	On	 the	
other	hand,	“A	child	understands	Pythagorean	Theorem”	implies	a	state	she	


















“What	 is	 involved	 in	having	understanding	may	well	be	even	more	obscure	 than	what	 is	 in-
volved	 in	having	knowledge.	But	 it	 seems	clear	 enough	 that	 it	 includes	having	a	 true	grasp	


































“I	propose	that	understanding is the state of comprehension of nonpropositional structures of 
reality.”	(Ibid.,	p.	242)
The	most	influential	account	of	understanding	is	provided	by	Jonathan	Kvan-
vig.	His	 interest	 is	 in	 two	 senses	 of	 understanding:	when	understanding	 is	
claimed	for	some	object,	that	is,	subject	matter,	and	when	it	involves	under-
standing	that	something	is	the	case,	which	covers	understanding	why,	when,	
where	 and	 what.	 On	 a	 first	 approximation,	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	
are	both	factive.	One	important	difference	however	is	that	in	some	contexts,	
knowing	(Bill	Clinton)	does	not	 imply	understanding	(him).	Note	however	






concerning	 a	 particular	 subject,	 topic,	 or	 is-
sue.”	(Kvanvig	2003,	p.	188)
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avoiding	 error	 impose	 on	 us.	 Namely,	 from	
the	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view,	 our	 epistemic	
desire	 to	 acquire	 as	 much	 truth	 as	 possible	
might	 be	 restrained	 by	 our	 fear	 of	 getting	
things	wrong.	But	 if	we	 aim	 at	 understand-
ing,	and	understanding	can	be	reached	even	if	
there	are	some	erroneous	components	 in	 the	
wider	 system,	 then	one	can	 still	gain	cogni-







































a	matter	of	 internal	 connection,	 then	 it	 can	completely	 fail	 to	grasp	 things	









































“Cognitive	progress	 is	 no	piecemeal	 accretion	of	 separately	 established	 facts	 but	 a	 dynamic	
interplay	of	novel	proposals	and	entrenched	commitments.	 Integration	of	new	material	often	
requires	 reconfiguration	 of	 commitments	 already	 in	 place,	 revision	 or	 repudiation	 of	 earlier	
adoptions.”	(Elgin	1996,	p.	122)
What	 is	crucial	 is	 that	 she	does	not	 take	 the	 result	of	 such	a	process	 to	be	
knowledge	but	understanding.	In	accounting	for	such	a	view,	her	account	of	
understanding	 and	 the	 crucial	ways	 in	which	 it	 differs	 from	 knowledge	 is	
revealed:	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 do	 not	 share	 the	 same	 conditions.	
Knowledge	is	“a	permanent	achievement,	its	justification	unconditional	and	








to	 anti-luck	 epistemology	 might	 claim	 that	
the	source	of	 information	has	 to	be	 immune	
to	all	kinds	of	Gettier	like	scenarios,	even	if	
S	still	managed	to	(or	was	lucky	enough	to)	
‘choose’	 right,	 in	which	 case	 he	would	 side	
against	 Kvanving	 on	 this.	 Had	 it	 been	 too	
easy	for	S	to	go	wrong,	then,	even	if	he	in	fact	




This	 is	particularly	 so	 for	 those	who	defend	
externalist	accounts	of	knowledge	and	 justi-
fication,	 according	 to	which	 all	 that	 is	 nec-
essary	 for	 knowledge	 is	 reliable	 belief-for-
mation	 process.	 In	 fact,	Goldman,	 the	main	
defender	of	such	a	view,	rejects	the	need	for	
a	cognizer	to	wonder	about	the	reliability	or	




think	 reliabilism	 is	 enough	 for	 justification	
(in	the	sense	that	justification	has	to	include	
internalist	 component),	 it	 has	 to	 be	 admit-
ted	 that	 in	 many	 instances	 when	 cognizers	

























to	 be”	 (Ibid.),	 given	 that	 it	 extends	 to	 domains	 and	 objects	 that	 cannot	 be	
captured	by	knowledge.	These	include	understanding	rules,	reasons,	actions,	
passions,	objectives,	obstacles,	 techniques,	 tools,	forms,	functions,	fictions,	






















































































in	 reaching	 knowledge.	Then,	 had	 he	 been	 humble	 and	 perhaps	 restrained	
15





































to	making	 one’s	 life	 good.	Therefore,	 any	 theory	 of	wisdom,	 on	 the	 third	
view,	should	necessary	take	into	consideration	the	intuitive	idea	that	wisdom	
is	somehow	connected	to	the	practical	side	of	us:	deciding	how	to	live	and	




































































Ryan	 2012,	 p.	 108.	 Ryan’s	 account	 is	 spe-
cific	 in	 that	 she	doesn’t	 see	knowledge	as	 a	
requirement	for	wisdom,	only	that	person	has	





























































that	we	 exhibit.	Who	we	 are	 as	 people	 is	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 determined	 by	
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Cilj je ovoga rada skroman: želim ponuditi osvrt na neke od najnovijih razvoja u epistemolo­
giji, okarakteriziranih posebnim pomakom koji se nazire već neko vrijeme. Pomak je najlakše 
objasniti kao napuštanje tradicionalne, monističke slike (prema kojoj je znanje jedino važno 
postignuće u pokušaju da spoznajno zahvatimo svijet) i prihvaćanje pluralizma (prema kojemu 
postoje i drugi važni spoznajni dosezi prema kojima bismo trebali ustrajati, ponajviše razumije-
vanje i mudrost). Jedan od najvažnijih aspekata toga pomaka pitanje je koje spoznajno stanje 
nasljeđuje znanje kao vrhovnu epistemičku vrijednost i taj će me aspekt najviše zanimati. Tvrdit 
ću da pluralistička slika bolje odgovara našem spoznajnom susretanju sa svijetom, s drugim 
ljudima i sa samima sobom. U tome smislu, umjesto da navijamo za to da postoji neka jedna 
vrijednost koja će se nalaziti na epistemičkom tronu, trebali bismo uvažiti nezamjenjiv doprinos 
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Epistemisches Spiel der Throne
Zusammenfassung
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist bescheiden: Ich möchte einen Rückblick auf einige der letzten Ent­
wicklungen innerhalb der Epistemologie halten, die durch eine besondere Verschiebung ge­
kennzeichnet sind, welche bereits seit einiger Zeit durchschimmert. Diese Verschiebung wird am 
eingängigsten erklärt als eine Abkehr von der traditionellen, monistischen Vorstellung (wonach 
das Wissen die einzige bedeutende Errungenschaft ist, in unserem Versuch, die Welt erkenntnis­
mäßig zu erfassen) und die Anerkenntnis des Pluralismus (nach dem auch andere belangreiche 
erkenntnismäßige Leistungen bestehen, die wir anvisieren sollten – zumeist sind dies Verständ­
nis und Weisheit. Einer der wichtigsten Aspekte dieser Verschiebung ist die Frage, welche Er­
kenntnislage das Wissen als den obersten epistemischen Wert erbt, und dieser Aspekt wird mein 
Interesse am stärksten erregen. Ich werde behaupten, dass das pluralistische Bild besser ge­
eignet ist für unsere erkenntnisbezogene Begegnung mit der Welt, mit anderen Menschen sowie 
mit sich selbst. In diesem Sinne, anstatt die Option zu favorisieren, dass es den einen Wert gibt, 
welcher den epistemischen Thron besteigen wird, sollten wir den unersetzlichen Beitrag jedes 
Einzelnen von uns akzeptieren, in seiner Anstrengung, sich damit zu versöhnen, wer wir sind 




Le jeu épistémique des trônes
Résumé
Le but de ce travail est modeste : je souhaite exposer un compte rendu de certains progrès ré­
cents en épistémologie, caractérisés par un déplacement particulier qui se profile depuis déjà 
un certain temps. La manière la plus évidente d’expliquer ce déplacement est de le voir comme 
abandon de l’image traditionnelle, monistique (selon laquelle le savoir est la seule acquisition 
importante dans la tentative de saisir le monde d’un point de vue de la connaissance) et d’ac­
cepter le pluralisme (selon lequel il existe d’autres significations pour la connaissance sur la 
base desquelles nous devrions persévérer, spécialement dans la compréhension et la sagesse). 
L’un des aspects les plus importants de ce déplacement est la question de savoir quel est l’état 
de la connaissance dont hérite le savoir en tant que valeur épistémique suprême, et c’est bien 
cet aspect qui va le plus m’intéresser. J’affirmerai que l’image de pluralité convient mieux à no­
tre rencontre avec le monde, avec les autres et avec nous­même d’un point de vue de la connais­
sance. En ce sens, au lieu d’encourager l’idée qu’il n’existe qu’une seule et unique valeur qui 
va se trouver sur le trône épistémique, nous devrions accepter l’irremplaçable contribution 
de chacun de nous dans le but de nous réconcilier avec qui nous sommes et avec comment est 
constitué notre expérience du monde constituée. 
Mots-clés
savoir,	monisme	épistémique,	pluralisme	épistémique,	compréhension,	sagesse
